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Abstract  
 
Despite high economic growth in the last decades, many developing countries remain into 
poverty, income inequality and unemployment of young people, which have led some 
countries to adopt inclusive growth strategies. In this paper, we show how inclusive growth 
can boost tax revenue mobilization in developing countries. Effective public policies, 
improving social cohesion are fundamental to meet citizens’ aspirations and therefore incite 
them to comply with taxes. To this end, this study uses GMM techniques to deal with 
endogeneity issue and spans 55 developing countries over the period of 1995-2010. We find 
that inclusive growth has positive effect on tax revenue mobilization. This finding is robust to 
various aspects of inclusive growth measurements and additional controls.  
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1. Introduction 
Many countries are recognizing the urgency of enhancing tax resource mobilisation (TRM) in 
a global climate of economic uncertainty and competition. The global crisis convinced policy-
makers in developing countries that the time had come to reduce their dependence on external 
resources and their vulnerability to external financial shocks by addressing the potential of 
TRM. TRM at a significant level is essential to solidify ownership over development strategy, 
and to strengthen the bonds of accountability between governments and their citizens. In 
effect, DRM provides “policy space” to developing countries which is often constrained under 
the terms and conditions of external resource providers. According to Mascagni, Moore and 
Mccluskey (2014), the governments in developing countries need additional financial 
resources to address the huge development challenges they face. While great progress was 
made in recent years towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, a large 
proportion of people in low-income countries still face poverty, inequality, unemployment of 
young people, malnutrition, vulnerability to natural disasters and preventable diseases, 
amongst others. Aid has certainly contributed to alleviating some of these issues, but it is 
becoming increasingly clear that the development challenge requires increasing tax revenue. 
Developing countries across the world always suffer from insufficient supply of internal 
resources. Very low tax to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio is a common characteristic of 
most of the developing countries. This situation remains contrasted with the high economic 
growth rates that developing countries have experienced in recent decades. Economic growth 
is expected to raise people’s income, create job and opportunities and therefore increase the 
tax base. However, this expectation is sometimes hampered by the absence of straight 
mathematical relationship between economic growth and the increase in the tax base. Indeed, 
it must that the benefits of growth to be shared to a large part of the population in order to 
meet citizens’ aspirations (availability of public goods, reduction of poverty and inequality) 
and therefore incite them to comply with taxes. Previous literature focused on economic 
structural characteristics and institutional quality as the main determinants of tax mobilisation 
and failed to integrate tax payer expectations of government policies and their willingness to 
pay taxes (see for a review Chelliah 1971, Stotsky and WoldeMariam 1997, Bird, Martinez-
Vazquez and Torgler 2008; Haque 2011; Crivelli and Gupta 2014). This papers aims to fill 
the gap in previous literature by focusing on the effect of inclusive growth on the mobilization 
of tax revenue. According to Alm et al. (1992), tax compliance increases with (perceptions of) 
the availability of public goods and services. They suggest that governments can increase 
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compliance by providing goods that citizens prefer in a more efficient and accessible manner, 
or by more effectively emphasizing that taxes are necessary for the receipt of government 
services. Accordingly, the main concern of taxpayers is what they get directly in return for 
their tax payments in the form of public services. Therefore, the implementation of an 
effective and fair taxation system is essential in order to finance public policies given the fact 
that there is strong relationship between citizens and the state. According to the concept of 
resource bargain, the state negotiates resources to finance public policies and the citizens 
expect in return for their tax payments in the form of public services (Fjeldstad and Semboja 
2001; Moore 2004). Then, individuals may pay taxes because they value the goods provided 
by the government, recognizing that their payments are necessary both to help finance the 
goods and services and to get others to contribute (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001). Regarding 
this theory of fiscal exchange, tax compliance depends on the respect of this contractual 
relationship and the policies of the government. If the fiscal exchange is enforced, that implies 
that populations will benefit from growth though government policies. That is what expected 
with inclusive growth policy. Inclusive growth ensures that the economic opportunities 
created by growth are available to all-particularly the poor-to the maximum possible extent. 
The growth process creates new economic opportunities that are unevenly distributed. 
Inclusive growth means the participation of all in the tangible benefits of economic growth, 
made possible mainly by job creation that can lead to inequality and poverty reduction. 
Taxation plays a vital role in promoting citizenship and reciprocal relations between the 
taxpayer and government. It is about encouraging people to make a contribution for which 
they receive something in return. In Sierra Leone, for instance, public resistance to the 
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax in 2009 (which is another name for value added 
taxes (VAT)) forced the government and its key donors to link the new tax to improved 
provision of services. 
These discussions aforementioned reveal that inclusive growth can boost tax revenue 
mobilization or tax compliance. This paper aims to study the relationship between inclusive 
growth and tax revenue mobilization. While a very limited works studied the determinants of 
inclusive growth (See Anand, Mishra and Peiris, 2013), there is no empirical study that 
tackles the consequences or the benefits of inclusive growth for developing countries. This 
paper is attempting to come to grips with the link between inclusive growth and tax revenue 
mobilization and therefore it seeks to understand how to mobilize resource in order to finance 
development. No doubts that effective public policies, improving social cohesion and the 
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nexus between revenues and public goods are fundamental to meet the aspirations of the 
citizens and therefore encourage them to comply with taxes.  
Using GMM estimators to deal with endogeneity issue, our results show that inclusive growth 
has positive impact on tax revenue mobilization. This finding is robust to various controls and 
alternative measurements of inclusive growth index and the dependent variable.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the measure of the inclusive 
growth index. Section 3 specifies the empirical strategy and the explanatory variables, while 
Section 4 presents the results obtained from the estimates. In section 5, we analyze 
transmission channels through which inclusive growth could affect tax revenue mobilization. 
Section 6 concludes and draws up some policy recommendations.  
 
2. Measurement of Inclusive growth 
The notion of inclusive growth has captured a growing importance in the literature, reflecting 
the desire to define and measure an index that includes most prominent indicators of long 
lasting development policies. However, it is noteworthy that there is no consensus on how to 
define inclusive growth and how to measure it. The definition of inclusive growth originates 
from the notion of pro-poor growth. The term “inclusive growth” was coined by Kakwani and 
Pernia 2000) and refers to the notion of participation in and benefitting from growth 
processes. Therefore, it goes beyond the reduced concept of pro-poor growth that focused on 
the level and distributions of income outcomes and takes into account non-income outcomes. 
Since then, there is a battery of works which tried to capture the dimensions of an inclusive 
growth process and conceptualize the patterns of inclusive growth (See for review Ali and 
Son 2007, Bhalla 2007, Ianchovichina and Lundstrom 2009, Klasen 2010, McKinley 2010, 
Rauniyar and Kanbur 2010, Blanke and others 2015).  The most common of all these works is 
that economic growth does not automatically translate into widely shared gains and inclusive 
growth is mostly referred to poverty alleviation, inequality reduction and employment. In a 
report on inclusive growth, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (2012) identifies three problems that even the record levels of growth of the 1990s 
and decade of 2000s failed to tackle: poverty, unemployment and inequality. Therefore, 
inclusive growth has two dimensions: benefit-sharing (inequality and poverty) and 
participation (employment). The benefit-sharing dimension looks into whether the process led 
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to a decrease in poverty and in income inequality. This segment of the analysis is aligned with 
the concept of “relative pro-poor growth”, which differs from “absolute pro-poor growth” due 
to the understanding that, for growth to be pro-poor, poor people’s income must grow faster 
than that of wealthier people, resulting in a decrease in inequality (Grosse, Harttgen and 
Klasen 2008). The participation dimension is the second significant dimension in 
conceptualizing inclusive growth and in differentiating it from pro-poor growth. The 
participation dimension looks into how the society is involved in the process, given that such 
involvement is essential for promoting social coherence and for capacity-building, which are 
crucial for the sustainability of an inclusive growth process. Analyzed in the economic sphere, 
a participatory process can be thought of as characterized by generating employment for a 
significant part of a country’s population. Such conceptualization of inclusive growth based 
on three dimensions is in line with Ramos, Ali and Son (2007), Ramos, Ranieri and Lammens 
(2013) who attempted to define and measure inclusive growth. Notwithstanding the 
unconcluded concept of inclusive growth, some authors have tried to measure it. However, 
likewise the absence of definition, the measurement of inclusive growth is still not settled. 
Many researchers merely compare trends in economic growth, poverty line, income inequality 
and social indicators (See Habito 2009) or construct a simple average of indicators (See 
McKinley 2010, Ramos, Ranieri, and Lammens 2013). However, all of these attempts suffer 
from serious shortcomings. First, an update to any attribute of a composite index causes the 
index to be modified and the weights are highly arbitrary and sensitive to the choices of the 
author. Second, a merely analysis of trends does not give us a sense of how much is growth 
inclusiveness and then does not give us neither a clear picture nor very much of an idea on 
how to proceed. In this paper, we follow closely Ali and Son (2007) who attempted to 
construct inclusive growth index using a macro social mobility function, following the micro 
literature on income distribution. This measure of inclusive growth is based on a utilitarian 
social welfare function drawn from consumer choice literature, where inclusive growth 
depends on two factors: (i) income growth; and (ii) income distribution or employment. More 
specifically, Ali and Son (2007) propose an income equity index as:  
𝑤 = 𝑦
∗̅̅̅̅
?̅?
                                      (1) 
Where 𝑤 is the equity index, ?̅?  is the average of income or employment rate and 𝑦∗̅̅ ̅ 
represents inclusive growth. 
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Equation (1) implies that income or opportunities are equitably (inequitably) distributed if 𝑤 
is greater (less) than 1. For a completely equitable society, 𝑤 = 1. Rearranging, ?̅?∗ = 𝑤 ∗ ?̅?.  
Inclusive growth requires increasing ?̅?∗, which could be achieved by: (i) increasing ?̅? , i.e 
increasing average income through growth or the average level of opportunities; (ii) 
increasing the equity index of income or the index of opportunities, 𝑤; or (iii) a combination 
of (i) and (ii). Differentiating the above equation: 
𝑑?̅?∗ = 𝑤 ∗ 𝑑?̅? + 𝑑𝑤 ∗ ?̅?                   (2) 
Where 𝑑?̅?∗ measures the change in the degree of inclusive growth. If 𝑑?̅?∗ > 0, growth is 
more inclusive. Equation (2) allows us to decompose inclusive growth into income growth 
and change in equity or opportunities in the society. The first term in the right side of equation 
(2) is the contribution of increase in average income (keeping income distribution or average 
opportunities constant) while the second term is the contribution of changes in the income 
distribution or job opportunities (keeping the average income or employment rate unchanged). 
Therefore, inclusive growth depends on the sign and the magnitude of the two terms. It is 
noteworthy that the two terms can be as well as all positive (growth is inclusive) or negative 
(growth is not inclusive) or a combination of different signs of the two terms. For this latter 
case, the inclusiveness of growth will depend on which contribution outweighs the other. To 
illustrate the evolution of inclusive growth, we rearrange equation (2) as: 
𝑑?̅?∗
?̅?∗
=
𝑑?̅?
?̅?
+
𝑑𝑤
𝑤
                        (3) 
This transformation decomposes inclusive growth into growth (?̅?) and percentage change in 
equity or opportunities (𝑤).  
 
3. Data and stylized facts 
Our dataset includes 55 developing countries, only data availability restricted our sample (see 
the appendix for a list of countries). As pointed out above, we focus on income inequality and 
employment. We collect annual data for the period from 1995 to 2010. We define three-year 
panel data: 1995-1997; 1998-2000; 2001-2003; 2004-2006; 2007-2010. This type of data is 
preferable to pure time-series or cross-sectional data, as it marries possible inter-temporal 
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dynamics and important cross-country variation. Three-year averaging is, moreover, likely to 
minimize non-systematic errors in the data. GDP per capita and tax revenue over GDP are 
from IMF datasets (IFS and World Economic Outlook). Income inequality data refers to Gini 
index extracted from Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). We take 
the advantage of a recently-compiled cross-country dataset that distinguishes market (before 
taxes and transfers) inequality from net (after taxes and transfers) inequality. In this study, we 
consider the net income inequality index. Gini index is ranged between 0 and 100, with higher 
values representing high unequal income distribution.  To build the indicators of income 
distribution used in the econometric estimations, we reverse the original indicator of Gini 
Index by the following formula: Gi,t = (100 − Giniindex)/100. This transformation ranges G 
between 0 and 1. On this basis, G increases with the improvement of the distribution of 
income. As for employment, we extract data from International Labor Organization datasets. 
We choose as indicator employment to population ratio which is the proportion of a country's 
population that is employed. Ages 15 and older are generally considered the working-age 
population. The series is harmonized to account for differences in national data and scope of 
coverage, collection and tabulation methodologies as well as for other country-specific factors 
such as military service requirements.  The remaining variables include trade openness 
(import plus exports in percentage of GDP), the share of agriculture value added in percentage 
of GDP, natural resource rents in percentage of GDP, foreign aid per capita and public 
expenditures on education over GDP extracted from World Development Indicators database, 
the World Bank.  
We generate inclusive growth index for each 3-year window. In figure 1, we present the 
relationship between government revenue over GDP (excluded grants) and inclusive growth 
defined with respect to income inequality and employment rate. As we can observe, there is 
strong positive relationship between inclusive growth and government revenue. We will come 
back with further econometric analysis.  
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Figure 1: Inclusive growth and government revenue, 1995-2010. 
4. Econometric model 
Given the strong inertia of government revenue, we use a dynamic specification. More 
specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =∝ +𝛿𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋′𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (4) 
Where 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 represents government revenue for country 𝑖 in time 𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is inclusive 
growth, 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡 stands for other explanatory variables. We include 𝑣𝑖  to control for unobserved 
time-invariant country-level characteristics that are potentially correlated with government 
revenue and 𝜑𝑡 to control for time-varying shocks that affect all developing countries. 
Inclusive growth is suspected of endogeneity because of omitted variables bias and reverse 
causality. Indeed, some variables could affect both revenue and inclusive growth. For 
instance, given the high dependence of developing countries to external conditions, an 
international crisis may reduce government revenue as well as its ability to achieve its 
objectives, namely inclusive growth. Furthermore, endogeneity of revenue may be due to 
reserve causality. For example, a country that experiences high inclusive growth may 
mobilize taxes, while at the same time government uses mobilized resources to finance its 
policies and distribute between citizens. To deal with endogeneity issues arising from 
simultaneity bias and reverse causality, we use GMM estimators which are more suited for 
dynamic panel data. Apart from endogeneity of government revenue, GMM estimators allow 
us to correct for endogeneity of all right-hand side variables. There are two GMM estimators 
commonly used: the difference-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the system-
1
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GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). For the difference-
GMM estimator, equation (4) is differenced in first order in order to remove country fixed 
effects, and the first differentiated variables are instrumented by the lagged values of the 
variables in level. As for the system-GMM estimator, both equations in levels and in first 
differences are used in a system that allows the use of lagged differences and lagged levels of 
the explanatory variables as instruments. Therefore, system-GMM estimator is an extension 
of the difference-GMM estimator. In this paper, our preferred estimator is the system-GMM 
because it has been highlighted that the lagged values of variables in level as it is done with 
the difference-GMM estimator are sometimes poor instruments for variables in first 
differences. To check the validity of the instruments, we use the Hansen test for 
overidentifying restrictions and Arellano and Bond’s test that investigates that there is no 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals.  
Explanatory variables 
As for explanatory variables, we estimate our model using factors driving government 
revenues. In selecting all of these variables, we follow closely the previous literature. More 
specifically, beyond inclusive growth we include the following variables: 
The level of development defined as the log of real GDP per capita “Log(GDPPC”. Indeed, 
a higher level of development goes together with a higher capacity to pay and collect taxes, as 
well as a higher relative demand for public goods and services (see Chelliah 1971, Bahl 1971, 
Tanzi 1987, Gupta 2007, Pessino and Fenochietto 2010).  
The share of agriculture value added in percentage of GDP “Agriculture”. It is expected to 
be negatively associated with tax revenues because the sector is harder to tax (Stosky and 
WoldeMariam 1997, Gupta 2007, Botlole 2010). Agriculture sector in developing sector is 
characterized by a large number of small producers who sell their output in informal markets, 
either to exchange for other goods, or for self-consumption. This coupled with poor or a non-
existent book-keeping record makes it notoriously difficult to tax.  
Trade openness expressed as imports plus exports in percentage of GDP. Contrary to 
agriculture sector, trade taxes are easier to collect, especially in developing countries. 
Therefore, a high degree of openness is expected to generate a higher tax ratio (See Chelliah 
1971, Botlhole 2010, Pessino and Fenochietto 2010, Keen and Pery 2013).  
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 The total public expenditure on education as percent of GDP and represents the level of 
education “Education”. Indeed, more educated people can understand better how and why it is 
necessary to pay taxes. With a higher level of education compliance will be higher. Therefore, 
it is expected a positive relationship between this variable and the level of tax effort (Pessino 
and Fenochietto 2010, Keen and Pery 2013).  
 Total aid per capita “Aid”. Another concern is the potential tax displacement effect of aid. 
It is often argued that an increase in aid inflows will lower the government’s incentives to 
increase its tax effort, or even that tax revenues can be reduced due to policy reforms linked to 
aid flows (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001). We therefore include foreign aid per capita to 
control for this potential tax displacement effect of aid.  
Natural resource rents in percentage of GDP “natural_rents”. The effect of natural 
resources on government revenue is ambiguous. Indeed, on the one hand a resource-rich 
country can generate large taxable surplus (Gupta 2007), while on the other hand natural 
resources might reduce the incentives of the governments for collecting taxes (Lim 1988 and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2001). 
Quality of governance: We include “polity2” index that measures the degree of democracy 
in a country. It is widespread that quality of governance is a key factor driving tax 
mobilization (Gupta 2007, Le, Moreno-Dodson and Bayraktar 2012). 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline results 
We present here baseline results obtained by using OLS with fixed effects, difference GMM 
and system GMM. To check the importance of inclusive growth, we report on the one hand 
the results for the effects of economic growth, income inequality and employment on 
government revenue and on the other hand the effect of inclusive growth on government 
revenue. This allows us to compare the results of the two estimates and therefore show how 
inclusive growth more matters for tax mobilization. Table 1 reports results for the effects of 
GDP growth, income inequality and employment on government revenue, while Table 2 
reports results for inclusive growth. We observe that GDP growth is positively associated 
with government revenue, while income inequality (except column 8) and employment 
(except column 12) are not different from zero. However, Table 2 sheds light that the 
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coefficient associated with inclusive growth is strongly positive and significant in all columns 
(except column 4). Furthermore, this coefficient is high than the one associated to GDP 
growth in Table 1. Then inclusive growth more matters. In other words, an increase of 1 
percent in inclusive growth results in a rise of government revenue ranging between 0.12 and 
0.31 percent over GDP. When citizens benefit from growth, they are more likely to comply 
with tax authorities and this results in an increase of revenue collected by the government. 
This finding is consistent with the theory of fiscal exchange according to which compliance 
increases with (perceptions of) the availability of public goods and services. Governments 
may increase compliance by providing goods that citizens prefer in a more efficient and 
accessible manner (Alm et al. 1992). By offering new opportunities to all and reducing 
income inequality, government improves its accountability, increases tax bases and incites 
citizens to comply with taxes. Furthermore, we observe that the coefficient associated with 
inclusive growth measured with respect to income inequality is higher than when it is 
measured with respect to employment. Therefore, it might be thought that inequality 
reduction brings in more resources to the government than employment promotion.  
As for the remaining variables, we observe that the level of education, aid and natural 
resource rents are positively associated with government revenue, while the agriculture share 
in percentage of GDP affects negatively government revenue. These findings are consistent 
with previous works (Stosky and WoldeMariam 1997, Gupta 2007; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez 
and Torgler 2008).  
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Table 1: Testing for effects of gdp growth, income inequality and employment
Lag dep. variable 0.106 0.0821 0.0989 0.0946 -0.138 0.327*** 0.350*** -0.107 0.701*** 0.726*** 0.656*** 0.717***
(0.136) (0.131) (0.137) (0.135) (0.0883) (0.0867) (0.0898) (0.0727) (0.0840) (0.0854) (0.0846) (0.0707)
GDP growth 0.0512* 0.0455 0.1011*** 0.0694** 0.0523* 0.0508**
(0.0277) (0.0278) (0.0296) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0224)
Gini_net -0.0726 -0.0555 -0.0122 -0.0995* 0.0184 0.0501
(0.0637) (0.0599) (0.0602) (0.0594) (0.0516) (0.0536)
Employment 0.0398 0.0251 0.508** -0.103 0.0763 0.197***
(0.137) (0.129) (0.201) (0.147) (0.0915) (0.0753)
Log(gdppc) 0.564 1.039 0.859 0.441 7.004*** 15.14*** 16.92*** 7.649*** -0.759 1.138 -1.843 -1.837**
(2.158) (2.248) (2.362) (2.285) (1.600) (3.187) (3.118) (1.368) (1.337) (1.353) (1.328) (0.934)
Agriculture -0.0264 -0.0163 -0.0152 -0.0316 0.0417 -0.107** -0.186*** 0.0539 -0.0493 0.0416 -0.142*** -0.178***
(0.0555) (0.0566) (0.0588) (0.0565) (0.0746) (0.0501) (0.0682) (0.0628) (0.0664) (0.0660) (0.0348) (0.0384)
Trade 0.0304 0.0362* 0.0347 0.0298 0.0214 0.0355 0.0444* 0.0132 0.0167 0.00826 0.0431*** 0.0301***
(0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0225) (0.0214) (0.0299) (0.0246) (0.0260) (0.0220) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0147) (0.00963)
Education 1.628*** 1.549*** 1.533*** 1.608*** 1.209*** 1.458*** 2.008*** 1.398*** 1.319*** 1.407*** 1.952*** 2.037***
(0.424) (0.407) (0.440) (0.438) (0.392) (0.362) (0.440) (0.288) (0.254) (0.256) (0.338) (0.238)
Aid 0.0263** 0.0273** 0.0235* 0.0290** 0.0220 -0.0120 -0.0287 0.00524 0.0414*** 0.0312** 0.0575*** 0.0505***
(0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0123) (0.0207) (0.0161) (0.0223) (0.0151) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0178) (0.0115)
Natural_rents 0.381*** 0.380*** 0.377*** 0.383*** 0.497*** 0.549*** 0.568*** 0.510*** 0.120*** 0.106*** 0.118*** 0.130***
(0.0583) (0.0596) (0.0587) (0.0593) (0.0583) (0.0532) (0.0719) (0.0364) (0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0287) (0.0278)
Polity2 -0.0891 -0.113 -0.0975 -0.0961 0.148 0.0576 -0.149 0.124 0.225** 0.165** 0.176* 0.204***
(0.104) (0.105) (0.115) (0.103) (0.125) (0.133) (0.148) (0.110) (0.107) (0.0711) (0.0988) (0.0632)
Constant 3.979 4.113 -0.297 6.383 5.153 -12.68 7.131 -2.220
(16.15) (17.40) (17.33) (16.23) (13.21) (14.69) (15.18) (9.310)
Observations 151 151 151 151 91 91 91 91 151 151 151 151
Countries 54 54 54 54 38 38 38 38 54 54 54 54
R-squared 0.697 0.694 0.691 0.699
AR(1): p-value 0,028 0,472 0,031 0,136 0,01 0,01 0,016 0,003
AR(2): p-value 0,518 0,772 0,429 0,259 0,799 0,609 0,944 0,685
Hansen test, p-value 0,37 0,125 0,291 0,55 0,603 0,648 0,914 0,72
Nb instruments 8 8 8 8 12 12 12 12
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is government revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Fixed effects Difference-GMM System-GMM
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5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we analyze some conditional factors that can affect the positive relationship 
between inclusive growth and revenue mobilization. To this end, we consider some indicators 
of policies that a country can pursue to achieve inclusive development. For instance, to 
improve inclusive growth, developing countries can adopt policies such as building schools 
and hospitals, training teachers and doctors, providing access to water, sanitation and 
Table 2: Baseline results: effect of inclusive growth
Fixed effects Diff-GMM System-GMM Fixed effects Diff-GMM System-GMM
Lag dep. variable 0.122 -0.0249 0.689*** 0.121 -0.0234 0.732***
(0.137) (0.101) (0.0735) (0.142) (0.0927) (0.0766)
Inclusive_Growth 0.1235*** 0.3105*** 0.1424*** 0.1043 0.2738*** 0.1074*
(0.0391) (0.0574) (0.0489) (0.0684) (0.0757) (0.0602)
Log(gdppc) 2.022 12.97*** -1.321 1.089 11.51*** -0.856
(2.112) (3.068) (1.168) (2.408) (1.940) (0.953)
Agriculture -0.0333 -0.0355 -0.0834** -0.0252 0.0475 -0.0228
(0.0566) (0.0527) (0.0373) (0.0541) (0.0642) (0.0428)
Trade 0.0261 -0.0259 0.00543 0.0295 -0.0305 0.000797
(0.0187) (0.0212) (0.00965) (0.0217) (0.0345) (0.0106)
Education 1.562*** 1.062*** 1.197*** 1.605*** 1.686*** 1.280***
(0.410) (0.323) (0.204) (0.429) (0.340) (0.210)
Aid 0.0223* -0.00210 0.0404*** 0.0241* -0.00292 0.0317***
(0.0125) (0.0206) (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.0203) (0.0116)
Natural_rents 0.359*** 0.393*** 0.101*** 0.361*** 0.445*** 0.106***
(0.0539) (0.0664) (0.0235) (0.0567) (0.0677) (0.0292)
Polity2 -0.0653 0.145 0.0732 -0.0991 0.190 0.145*
(0.110) (0.122) (0.0814) (0.107) (0.133) (0.0746)
Constant -6.092 12.67 0.266 6.243
(16.01) (10.00) (18.18) (9.085)
Observations 151 91 151 151 91 151
Countries 54 38 54 54 38 54
R-squared 0.705 0.697
AR(1): p-value 0,321 0,014 0,197 0,009
AR(2): p-value 0,44 0,826 0,292 0,759
Hansen test, p-value 0,422 0,824 0,186 0,57
Nb instruments 8 12 8 12
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is government revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Measurement with respect to inequality Measurement with respect to employment
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transportation. Therefore, we interact inclusive growth index with the following variables: 
social protection expenditures; primary school pupil-teacher ratio (the number of pupils 
enrolled in primary school divided by the number of primary school teachers); the number of 
hospital beds per 1,000 people; infant mortality rate; and paved roads in percentage of total 
roads. Results are reported in Table 3.  
In the last decade, social protection has emerged as a policy framework employed to address 
poverty and vulnerability in developing countries. Therefore, social protection has a strong 
focus on poverty reduction and on providing support to the poorest (de Haan 2000; Barrientos 
and Hulme 2005). Such policy may reduce inequality and increases tax bases.   Table 3 shows 
that the interaction term with social protection is positive and significant (see column 1). This 
finding implies that inclusive growth is likely to be most helpful to government revenue when 
it is combined with social protection.    
Developing countries are characterized by low levels of human development (education and 
health) and their abilities to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) require 
enhanced actions. Education and health have to contend with the lack of teachers, nurses or 
doctors, with an absence or too little material. To benefit from growth, no doubts that people 
need access to education and health in order to become effective participants. Investments in 
the two sectors are visible and citizens can easily assess government actions and then decide 
their attitudes toward taxation. Results reported in Table 3 highlight that inclusive growth 
does not contribute to resources mobilization in countries experiencing an increase in pupil-
teacher ratio and mortality rate. The interaction terms with the two variables are negative and 
significant (see columns 2 and 4). However, when governments provide hospital beds, they 
are likely to incite citizens to pay taxes (see column 3).   
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At last, we consider transportation issue. Developing countries suffer from a severe lack of 
infrastructure. It is widely acknowledged that the infrastructure deficit is one of the key 
factors preventing developing countries from realizing its full potential for economic growth 
and competitiveness in global markets. Infrastructure can affect not only the quantum, but 
also the spatial distribution of economic activity. For instance, investments in transportation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag dep. variable 0.796*** 0.907*** 0.762*** 0.684*** 0.740***
(0.0690) (0.0440) (0.0708) (0.0666) (0.0539)
Inclusive_Growth 0.0741 0.2050*** 0.0283 0.7101*** 0.1249***
(0.0658) (0.0586) (0.0547) (0.2622) (0.0300)
Inclusive*Social protection 0.0715***
(0.0165)
inclusive*Pupil-teacher ratio -0.0512***
(0.0156)
Inclusive*Bed 0.0305**
(0.0137)
Inclusive*Mortality -0.1487**
(0.0671)
Inclusive*Road 0.1471
(0.2597)
Log(gdppc) 3.470*** 1.980*** 2.802*** -0.946 -0.187
(0.817) (0.726) (0.737) (0.722) (0.890)
Agriculture -0.123*** -0.112*** -0.0768*** -0.0877*** -0.0223
(0.0244) (0.0219) (0.0285) (0.0275) (0.0297)
Trade 0.0362*** -0.00685 -0.00146 -0.0120 -0.000747
(0.00940) (0.00692) (0.00707) (0.00921) (0.00905)
Education 0.289 0.474** 1.391*** 1.109*** 1.347***
(0.227) (0.211) (0.180) (0.177) (0.158)
Aid 0.0241** 0.0395*** 0.0395*** 0.0616*** 0.0418***
(0.0117) (0.0112) (0.00829) (0.00963) (0.00773)
Natural_rents 0.0418 0.0380* 0.0803*** 0.0805*** 0.0670**
(0.0277) (0.0221) (0.0268) (0.0241) (0.0275)
Polity2 -0.0814 0.139** 0.200*** 0.0789 0.0352
(0.0886) (0.0661) (0.0713) (0.0572) (0.0631)
Constant 37.53*** 17.16*** 21.55*** 10.72* 0.749
(6.402) (6.406) (6.945) (6.499) (7.145)
Observations 120 134 116 151 103
Countries 43 49 49 54 43
AR(1): p-value 0.019 0.028 0.04 0.023 0.099
AR(2): p-value 0.896 0.729 0.306 0.76 0.567
Hansen test, p-value 0.725 0.647 0.752 0.862 0.889
Nb instruments 12 12 12 12 12
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is government revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Table 3: Testing for sensitivity analysis-with inclusive growth measured with respect to income inequality
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infrastructure may cause some economic activity to shift from the roads areas, as a result of 
lower transportation. Such investments promote surely inclusive growth by allowing many 
people to benefit from these infrastructures. Table 3 shows that the interaction term with the 
percentage of paved roads is not different from zero.  
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
To check the validity of our findings we undertake a number of robustness exercises. Note 
that we reported here results for inclusive growth measured with respect to income inequality. 
Results for inclusive growth measured with respect to employment are similar and they are 
reported in appendix. 
(i) Testing for additional controls on baseline specification 
We add further controls in the baseline specification in order to take into account other 
variables likely to affect government revenue. These additional controls are terms of trade 
“TOT”, remittances in percentage of GDP “remittances”, consumer inflation rate “inflation”, 
public debt in percentage of GDP “debt”, conflict, and natural disaster “disaster”. Results are 
reported in Table 4. 
In first column we control for terms of trade shock
1
. Given the fact that developing countries 
are the subject of external shocks, controlling for terms of trade shocks aims to test whether 
our findings are robust to economic fluctuations. Several studies have found that changes in 
the terms of trade-the price of exports relative to the price of imports-can account for half of 
the output volatility in developing countries (Mendoza 1995, Kose 2002 and Broda 2003). 
Even controlling for these fluctuations, we observe that inclusive growth still affects 
positively government revenue. Furthermore, the coefficient associated with terms of trade 
shock is not different from zero.  
In column (2), we include migrants’ remittances. Beyond the private use of remittances, they 
can play a role at macroeconomic level. Indeed, remittances increase recipient endowments 
and therefore their capacity to pay taxes. Ebeke (2010) shows that remittances significantly 
increase both the level and the stability of government tax revenue ratio in receiving 
                                                          
1
 To measure the shock, we resort to the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter, which generates a smooth trend and 
stationary deviations. The deviation of terms of trade from its H-P-filtered trend will then capture the shock. We 
set a smoothing parameter of 6.25. 
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countries. Our results reported in column (2) are consistent with this finding. Moreover, our 
hypothesis about the effect of inclusive growth on government revenue remains in force.   
 
 
To ensure that our finding is robust to the Olivera–Tanzi effect, we include inflation rate in 
column (3). According to Olivera-Tanzi theory, an economic situation involving a period of 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag dep. variable 0.814*** 0.790*** 0.829*** 0.853*** 0.787*** 0.797*** 0.806***
(0.0614) (0.0645) (0.0546) (0.0543) (0.0591) (0.0634) (0.0753)
Inclusive_Growth 0.1529*** 0.0942** 0.0943*** 0.0825*** 0.1297*** 0.1275** 0.1184*
(0.0483) (0.0422) (0.0319) (0.0289) (0.0368) (0.0524) (0.0649)
Log(gdppc) -1.735 1.968** 1.062* 1.594** 1.258** -1.034 -0.458
(1.072) (0.950) (0.640) (0.714) (0.636) (0.702) (0.609)
Agriculture -0.0717* -0.0642** -0.0238 -0.0248 -0.0321 -0.0279 -0.0125
(0.0421) (0.0307) (0.0216) (0.0254) (0.0300) (0.0393) (0.0406)
Trade 0.0172* 0.0292*** 0.00770 -0.00833 0.00118 -0.00836 -0.0101
(0.00937) (0.00826) (0.00698) (0.00952) (0.00912) (0.00969) (0.0102)
Education 1.203*** 1.323*** 0.944*** 0.633*** 0.877*** 0.632*** 0.708***
(0.215) (0.233) (0.114) (0.0972) (0.196) (0.189) (0.239)
Aid 0.0225* 0.0328** 0.0279** 0.0124 0.0301*** 0.0288** 0.0240*
(0.0128) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0117) (0.0129) (0.0133)
Natural_rents 0.0800*** 0.0934*** 0.0521** 0.0421* 0.0555** 0.0595** 0.0478
(0.0248) (0.0276) (0.0217) (0.0236) (0.0255) (0.0245) (0.0302)
Polity2 0.0519 0.154** 0.104* 0.172*** -0.0794 0.148** 0.238***
(0.0799) (0.0630) (0.0595) (0.0478) (0.0544) (0.0643) (0.0864)
ToT 0.0766 0.127*** 0.0483 0.00998 0.0742* 0.0216 0.00974
(0.0555) (0.0371) (0.0418) (0.0561) (0.0414) (0.0550) (0.0708)
Remittances 0.136*** 0.119** -0.0835 0.128** -0.0512 -0.0524
(0.0521) (0.0563) (0.0576) (0.0508) (0.0658) (0.0711)
Inflation 0.00938 0.0230 0.0457 0.0329 0.00122
(0.0324) (0.0349) (0.0385) (0.0327) (0.0423)
Conflict 0.624 -1.343 -0.415 0.236
(0.589) (0.895) (0.864) (1.218)
Disaster 0.0337 0.0414 -0.00139
(0.0286) (0.0318) (0.0285)
GDP_growth -0.0431 0.0191
(0.0284) (0.0375)
Gini_net 0.0427
(0.0399)
Constant 11.90 13.49 8.127 14.52*** 10.95** 10.51* 4.094
(9.459) (8.825) (4.958) (5.144) (4.867) (5.771) (4.930)
Observations 149 148 148 148 148 148 148
Countries 53 52 52 52 52 52 52
AR(1): p-value 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.009
AR(2): p-value 0.589 0.672 0.688 0.597 0.563 0.447 0.617
Hansen test, p-value 0.756 0.862 0.786 0.927 0.955 0.955 0.979
Nb instruments 12 12 13 13 13 14 14
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is government revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Table 4: Testing for additional controls-with inclusive growth measured with respect to income inequality
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high inflation in a country results in a decline in the volume of tax collection and a slow 
deterioration of real tax proceeds being collected by the government of that country. Table 4 
shows that we do not find Olivera-Tanzi effect, while inclusive growth remains important 
driver of government revenue.  
In columns (4) and (5), we include conflict and natural disaster. Indeed, both conflicts and 
natural disasters destroy economies and dislocate societies and therefore make tax collection 
difficult. Even controlling for the two types of difficult situations, inclusive growth still 
affects positively government revenue.  
In last columns (6) and (7), we control for GDP growth and income inequality index in order 
to ensure that our results are not sensitive to these two variables. We find that not only the two 
variables are not significantly different from zero but also inclusive growth remains strongly 
significant and positive.  
Overall, we conclude that our finding is robust to many additional controls. Then, inclusive 
growth matters for resource mobilization in developing world through the increase in tax base 
and the incentive to comply with taxes. 
 
 
(ii) Testing for alternative main dependent variable 
Up to now, we use total government revenue excluded grants as main dependent variable. 
Government Revenues encompass social contributions (e.g. contributions for pensions, health 
and social security), taxes other than social contributions (e.g. taxes on consumption, income, 
wealth, property and capital), and other revenues. Here, we exclusively consider tax revenues 
in percentage of GDP in order to take into account the real capacity to increase revenue 
through taxation.  Results are reported in Table 5. As we can observe, the coefficients 
associated with inclusive growth are strongly significant and positive in all columns except 
columns 2. However, these coefficients are smaller than those of table 2 and 4. This can be 
due to the exclusion of other sources of revenues. As for the other independent variables, we 
find an Oliveria-Tanzi effect (see column 4-8), while conflict and natural disasters are 
negatively associated with tax revenue.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lag dep. variable 0.708*** 0.824*** 0.811*** 0.754*** 0.790*** 0.780*** 0.709*** 0.698***
(0.0582) (0.0468) (0.0478) (0.0285) (0.0247) (0.0181) (0.0258) (0.0262)
Inclusive_Growth 0.0853* 0.0712 0.1269*** 0.0763** 0.0593*** 0.0779*** 0.0986*** 0.1110***
(0.0465) (0.0466) (0.0304) (0.0316) (0.0187) (0.0277) (0.0238) (0.0254)
Log(gdppc) -0.101 1.414*** 1.383*** 0.846** 1.515*** 0.522** 0.121 0.186
(0.552) (0.468) (0.415) (0.377) (0.325) (0.219) (0.279) (0.307)
Agriculture -0.0584*** -0.0180 -0.0489*** -0.0165 0.0104 0.00860 -0.00253 -0.0127
(0.0193) (0.0251) (0.0187) (0.0153) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0168) (0.0219)
Trade 0.00796 0.00629 -0.0117 -0.00920 0.0193*** -0.00727 0.0111* -0.00857
(0.0123) (0.00957) (0.0116) (0.00810) (0.00716) (0.00678) (0.00587) (0.0104)
Education 0.000805 0.0552 0.0507 0.144* 0.161** 0.111 0.375*** 0.364***
(0.155) (0.128) (0.108) (0.0786) (0.0676) (0.125) (0.0840) (0.117)
Aid 0.0511*** 0.0485*** 0.0499*** 0.0308*** 0.0356*** 0.0279*** 0.0248*** 0.0265***
(0.0115) (0.0134) (0.0116) (0.00497) (0.00550) (0.00381) (0.00413) (0.00440)
Natural_rents 0.105*** 0.0873*** 0.0752*** 0.0652*** 0.0333** 0.0494*** 0.0545*** 0.0601***
(0.0193) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0170) (0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0110) (0.0141)
Polity2 0.198*** 0.196*** 0.192*** 0.0984** 0.0470 0.0390 0.0946*** 0.124***
(0.0619) (0.0596) (0.0549) (0.0476) (0.0388) (0.0433) (0.0298) (0.0294)
ToT -0.0568 -0.0422 -0.122*** -0.143*** -0.0708*** -0.0371* -0.0432**
(0.0405) (0.0332) (0.0276) (0.0228) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0196)
Remittances 0.0218 0.0716*** 0.0666*** 0.0725*** -0.00618 0.0138
(0.0338) (0.0172) (0.0258) (0.0261) (0.0309) (0.0314)
Inflation -0.0900*** -0.106*** -0.102*** -0.120*** -0.130***
(0.0108) (0.00957) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0154)
Conflict -1.292*** 0.230 -0.736** 0.535
(0.308) (0.276) (0.306) (0.379)
Disaster -0.0448*** -0.0448*** -0.0422***
(0.0107) (0.0128) (0.0130)
GDP_growth 0.0489*** 0.0523***
(0.0165) (0.0177)
Gini_net 0.0150
(0.0139)
Constant 3.758 -11.73*** -7.550** -5.220* -10.97*** -4.076** -1.446 -2.681
(4.321) (4.139) (3.241) (3.080) (2.612) (1.771) (2.206) (3.114)
Observations 147 145 144 144 144 144 144 144
Countries 55 54 53 53 53 53 53 53
AR(1): p-value 0.044 0.044 0.067 0.038 0.062 0.048 0.052 0.04
AR(2): p-value 0.217 0.217 0.179 0.178 0.176 0.196 0.186 0.192
Hansen test, p-value 0.525 0.525 0.735 0.358 0.338 0.378 0.897 0.961
Nb instruments 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 14
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is tax revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Table 5: Testing for alternative dependent variable-with inclusive growth measured with respect to income inequality
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(iii) Testing for alternative measure of inclusive growth 
We now change our measure of inclusive growth. So far, we employed Ali and Son (2007)’s 
methodology to construct inclusive growth index. We test whether our results are robust to an 
alternative measure of inclusive growth. We follow Ramos, Ranieri, and Lammens (2013) by 
constructing a composite index combining the data on income inequality and employment 
rate. We first compute the simple average of the Gini index and employment rate and then we 
compare to GDP growth within each three-year window. Results reported in Table 6 do not 
alter our previous findings. In other words, inclusive growth policies have positive effects on 
tax revenue mobilization.   
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lag dep. variable 0.690*** 0.794*** 0.784*** 0.848*** 0.822*** 0.774*** 0.805*** 0.839***
(0.0741) (0.0715) (0.0684) (0.0516) (0.0564) (0.0603) (0.0593) (0.0889)
Inclusive_Growth 0.2164*** 0.1610** 0.1376** 0.1810*** 0.1894*** 0.2092*** 0.3107*** 0.3612***
(0.0670) (0.0685) (0.0677) (0.0381) (0.0463) (0.0498) (0.0887) (0.0957)
Log(gdppc) -1.248 1.766** 1.708** 1.101* 1.086* -0.683 -0.932 -0.763
(1.015) (0.896) (0.762) (0.584) (0.647) (0.577) (0.730) (0.715)
Agriculture -0.0855** -0.0622 -0.0587* -0.0272 -0.0101 -0.0147 -0.0178 6.73e-05
(0.0379) (0.0394) (0.0343) (0.0205) (0.0274) (0.0320) (0.0388) (0.0354)
Trade 0.0125 0.0120 0.0262*** 0.00234 -0.0113 -0.00467 -0.00702 -0.0101
(0.00844) (0.00887) (0.00716) (0.00465) (0.00865) (0.00818) (0.00949) (0.00946)
Education 1.194*** 1.245*** 1.414*** 1.019*** 0.819*** 0.891*** 0.873*** 0.936***
(0.181) (0.158) (0.191) (0.128) (0.151) (0.194) (0.167) (0.334)
Aid 0.0431*** 0.0215* 0.0302** 0.0267** 0.0179 0.0296** 0.0213 0.0143
(0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0110) (0.0128) (0.0116) (0.0143) (0.0123)
Natural_rents 0.0992*** 0.0825*** 0.0803*** 0.0302 0.0255 0.0376 0.0293 0.0357
(0.0288) (0.0291) (0.0279) (0.0215) (0.0239) (0.0259) (0.0282) (0.0393)
Polity2 0.111 0.0715 0.165*** 0.114*** 0.158*** 0.0667 0.226*** 0.263***
(0.0729) (0.0736) (0.0527) (0.0424) (0.0464) (0.0455) (0.0626) (0.100)
TOT 0.106** 0.153*** 0.0552 0.0599 0.0915** 0.0281 0.00632
(0.0512) (0.0424) (0.0352) (0.0481) (0.0427) (0.0507) (0.0596)
Remittances 0.137** 0.139*** 0.132** 0.161*** -0.0750 -0.0348
(0.0542) (0.0485) (0.0563) (0.0515) (0.0680) (0.0758)
Inflation 0.0116 0.0370 -0.0622* 0.00442 -0.0528
(0.0284) (0.0355) (0.0368) (0.0343) (0.0369)
Conflict 0.221 -1.116 -0.194 -0.430
(0.610) (0.964) (0.880) (0.994)
Disaster 0.0344 0.0267 0.0221
(0.0279) (0.0304) (0.0287)
GDP growth 0.0731** 0.0866***
(0.0366) (0.0306)
Gini net 0.0364
(0.0596)
Constant 10.99 12.43 11.23 8.467* 10.33** 6.746 9.307 5.576
(8.895) (7.963) (7.339) (4.384) (4.800) (4.707) (5.766) (6.947)
Observations 151 149 148 148 148 148 148 148
Countries 54 53 52 52 52 52 52 52
AR(1): p-value 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011
AR(2): p-value 0.969 0.589 0.647 0.751 0.688 0.649 0.552 0.489
Hansen test, p-value 0.712 0.642 0.803 0.863 0.946 0.948 0.99 0.996
Nb instruments 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 14
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is government revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Table 6: Testing for alternative measure of inclusive growth
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of inclusive growth on tax revenue mobilization. 
Effective public policies, improving social cohesion and the nexus between revenues and 
public goods are fundamental to meet the aspirations of the citizens and therefore encourage 
them to comply with taxes. This paper uses GMM techniques to deal with endogeneity issue 
and covers 55 developing countries over the period of 1995-2010. We found that inclusive 
growth has a positive effect on tax revenue mobilization. This finding is robust both for 
inclusive growth measured with respect to income inequality and employment; various 
additional controls, alternative measure of inclusive growth and the dependent variable. 
Furthermore, this positive effect works in countries where inclusive growth is associated with 
social protection and an increase in the number of hospital beds. However, infant mortality 
rate dampens the gains of inclusive growth.  To mobilize sufficient tax revenue for the post-
2015 International Development Agenda, our findings are important in terms of policy 
recommendations. First, we call for the adoption of inclusive development strategies in 
developing countries that meet citizen needs. Developing country incumbents should improve 
public services through reforms and promote efficiency, transparency and accountability in 
the use of public resources in order to ensure social inclusion of people. Employment and 
combating income inequality should be promoted to allow everyone to participate in society 
and the economy. Education and health are major sectors which require important 
investments. Second, concerted efforts should be made to increase tax compliance and 
therefore mobilize broad mix of resources.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lag dep. variable 0.732*** 0.779*** 0.799*** 0.829*** 0.870*** 0.825*** 0.735*** 0.805***
(0.0766) (0.0582) (0.0649) (0.0621) (0.0592) (0.0648) (0.0569) (0.0739)
Inclusive_Growth 0.1074* 0.1034 0.2031*** 0.1551*** 0.1992*** 0.1881*** 0.3458*** 0.3033***
(0.0602) (0.0711) (0.0734) (0.0380) (0.0464) (0.0493) (0.0852) (0.0874)
Log(gdppc) -0.856 -1.175 -1.346 1.372** 1.101** -0.934 0.0914 -1.117
(0.953) (0.906) (0.913) (0.615) (0.558) (0.704) (0.190) (0.724)
Agriculture -0.0228 -0.0175 -0.0533 -0.0268 -0.00268 -0.00800 -0.0400** 0.0103
(0.0428) (0.0391) (0.0371) (0.0229) (0.0252) (0.0365) (0.0187) (0.0338)
Trade 0.000797 -0.00703 0.0272*** 0.000317 0.0208** 0.0152** 0.0160* -0.0150
(0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.00745) (0.00832) (0.00732) (0.00865) (0.0101)
Education 1.280*** 1.299*** 1.553*** 1.058*** 0.730*** 0.798*** 1.137*** 0.971***
(0.210) (0.201) (0.155) (0.131) (0.122) (0.194) (0.213) (0.276)
Aid 0.0317*** 0.0216* 0.0250** 0.0248** 0.0165 0.0219* 0.0126 0.0139
(0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0117)
Natural_rents 0.106*** 0.0834*** 0.0557** 0.0317 0.0126 0.0334 0.0440 0.0399
(0.0292) (0.0301) (0.0240) (0.0208) (0.0277) (0.0299) (0.0335) (0.0405)
Polity2 0.145* 0.103 0.166*** -0.0685 0.128** -0.0889 0.148** 0.182**
(0.0746) (0.0752) (0.0577) (0.0591) (0.0555) (0.0583) (0.0667) (0.0771)
ToT 0.0715 0.178*** 0.0536 0.0542 0.0498 -0.00204 -0.0260
(0.0629) (0.0603) (0.0411) (0.0456) (0.0482) (0.0509) (0.0615)
Remittances 0.140* 0.158** 0.139** 0.156** -0.0460 -0.0917
(0.0720) (0.0666) (0.0589) (0.0631) (0.0565) (0.0684)
Inflation 0.0361 0.0349 0.0309 0.0268 0.00972
(0.0373) (0.0361) (0.0399) (0.0350) (0.0317)
Conflict 0.555 -0.962 0.188 -0.00969
(0.636) (0.961) (0.883) (0.960)
Disaster 0.0354 0.0376 0.0200
(0.0282) (0.0318) (0.0377)
GDP_growth -0.0675 -0.0655
(0.0429) (0.0398)
Employment -0.00727
(0.0471)
Constant 6.243 7.894 7.331 10.62** 10.14** 9.113 0 10.09
(9.085) (7.762) (8.281) (5.020) (4.121) (5.835) (0) (6.609)
Observations 151 149 148 148 148 148 148 148
Countries 54 53 52 52 52 52 52 52
AR(1): p-value 0.009 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.009
AR(2): p-value 0.759 0.503 0.935 0.746 0.711 0.681 0.633 0.648
Hansen test, p-value 0.57 0.718 0.611 0.508 0.824 0.764 0.974 0.995
Nb instruments 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 14
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is government revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Table A1: Testing for additional controls-with inclusive growth measured with respect to employment 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lag dep. variable 0.708*** 0.782*** 0.745*** 0.752*** 0.776*** 0.814*** 0.771*** 0.785***
(0.0692) (0.0464) (0.0435) (0.0294) (0.0169) (0.0250) (0.0417) (0.0407)
Inclusive_Growth 0.1644*** 0.1571*** 0.1514*** 0.1812*** 0.1799*** 0.2110*** 0.1317*** 0.1394***
(0.0415) (0.0370) (0.0313) (0.0224) (0.0214) (0.0155) (0.0263) (0.0265)
Log(gdppc) -1.006 0.190 0.383 -0.218 0.152 -0.310 -0.415 -0.161
(0.665) (0.527) (0.338) (0.283) (0.362) (0.274) (0.311) (0.260)
Agriculture -0.0694*** -0.0571*** -0.0595*** -0.0164 0.00533 -0.0152 -0.0176 -0.0179
(0.0220) (0.0180) (0.0189) (0.0157) (0.0168) (0.0118) (0.0136) (0.0172)
Trade 0.0130 0.0260** 0.0285** 0.00435 0.0134* -0.00457 0.0191** 0.0216**
(0.0122) (0.0110) (0.0127) (0.00599) (0.00777) (0.00562) (0.00834) (0.00908)
Education 0.193 0.187 0.270** 0.354*** 0.482*** 0.376*** 0.320*** 0.353***
(0.165) (0.142) (0.108) (0.0977) (0.117) (0.0848) (0.124) (0.116)
Aid 0.0470*** 0.0476*** 0.0472*** 0.0224*** 0.0241*** 0.0193*** 0.0201*** 0.0127**
(0.0106) (0.0108) (0.00996) (0.00617) (0.00671) (0.00483) (0.00405) (0.00537)
Natural_rents 0.0904*** 0.0819*** 0.0887*** 0.0163 0.00890 -0.00535 0.0199 0.0128
(0.0233) (0.0180) (0.0185) (0.0172) (0.0106) (0.0193) (0.0176) (0.0243)
Polity2 0.169*** 0.228*** 0.212*** -0.0313 -0.00796 -0.0341 0.0650 0.0563
(0.0653) (0.0487) (0.0532) (0.0519) (0.0286) (0.0348) (0.0448) (0.0436)
ToT 0.0171 0.00662 0.0718*** 0.0810*** -0.00282 0.0335* 0.0616**
(0.0450) (0.0439) (0.0233) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0263)
Remittances -0.0439 -0.00395 0.0161 0.00620 0.0196 0.0547*
(0.0487) (0.0305) (0.0247) (0.0258) (0.0320) (0.0306)
Inflation -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.0991*** -0.102***
(0.00821) (0.00772) (0.00703) (0.00950) (0.00907)
Conflict -1.399*** -0.854*** -0.777*** -1.172***
(0.282) (0.291) (0.215) (0.370)
Disaster -0.0333*** -0.0215** 0.0158
(0.00957) (0.0108) (0.0158)
GDP_growth 0.0568 0.0615
(0.0598) (0.0614)
Employment -0.0214
(0.0214)
Constant 9.780* -2.867 -2.863 1.972 -1.687 1.700 3.773 2.740
(5.015) (4.412) (2.316) (2.234) (2.718) (1.983) (2.324) (2.630)
Observations 147 145 144 144 144 144 144 144
Countries 55 54 53 53 53 53 53 53
AR(1): p-value 0.041 0.031 0.049 0.035 0.034 0.057 0.053 0.037
AR(2): p-value 0.25 0.256 0.239 0.31 0.246 0.243 0.195 0.202
Hansen test, p-value 0.444 0.52 0.649 0.354 0.559 0.444 0.922 0.98
Nb instruments 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 14
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is tax revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Table A2: Testing for alternative dependent variable-with inclusive growth measured with respect to employment 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag dep. variable 0.764*** 0.889*** 0.836*** 0.689*** 0.725***
(0.0526) (0.0432) (0.0615) (0.0575) (0.0614)
Inclusive_Growth 0.0893 0.1966*** 0.2415*** 0.05600 0.1064**
(0.0782) (0.0741) (0.0935) (0.0452) (0.0414)
Inclusive*Social protection 0.0743***
(0.0208)
inclusive*Pupil-teacher ratio -0.0737***
(0.0175)
Inclusive*Bed 0.0193**
(0.0095)
Inclusive*Mortality -0.0516***
(0.0149)
Inclusive*Road 0.1317
(0.3356)
Log(gdppc) 3.318*** 2.224*** -0.872 -1.214 -0.584
(0.999) (0.568) (0.745) (0.833) (0.727)
Agriculture -0.133*** -0.0534*** 0.0213 -0.106*** -0.0356
(0.0303) (0.0178) (0.0380) (0.0353) (0.0354)
Trade 0.0206*** 0.0141* 0.0235*** -0.000354 -0.000892
(0.00701) (0.00742) (0.00791) (0.00768) (0.0103)
Education 0.0408 0.823*** 1.450*** 0.878*** 1.291***
(0.244) (0.193) (0.212) (0.173) (0.158)
Aid 0.0334*** 0.0288*** 0.0117 0.0470*** 0.0391***
(0.0120) (0.00807) (0.00925) (0.00701) (0.00847)
Natural_rents 0.0756*** 0.0400* 0.0313 0.104*** 0.0659**
(0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0264)
Polity2 0.0633 0.0855* 0.115 0.136** 0.00642
(0.0530) (0.0505) (0.0706) (0.0688) (0.0667)
Constant 35.64*** 17.27*** 4.738 13.18* 5.113
(9.257) (4.568) (6.710) (7.796) (6.200)
Observations 120 134 116 151 103
Countries 43 49 49 54 43
AR(1): p-value 0.028 0.044 0.042 0.015 0.086
AR(2): p-value 0.906 0.664 0.792 0.932 0.589
Hansen test, p-value 0.588 0.47 0.704 0.664 0.753
Nb instruments 12 12 12 12 12
Note: Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is government revenue in percentage of GDP.
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10%
Table A3: Testing for sensitivity analysis-with inclusive growth measured with respest to employment 
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Table A4: Data sources 
code Variable  Data sources 
Inclusive 
growth 
Inclusive growth measured with 
respect to income inequality 
and employment 
Author's calculations. Income inequality 
data are from SWIID (2013) and 
employment from ILO datasets 
Government 
revenue 
Government revenue in 
percentage of GDP 
IMF database 
Tax revenue Tax revenue in percentage of 
GDP 
IMF database 
Aid Aid per capita OECD-QWIDS datasets  
Natural rents Total natural resources rents 
(percentage of GDP) 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Remittances Remittances in percentage of 
GDP 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
GDPPC GDP per capita World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Terms trade Terms of trade IMF database 
Disaster Natural disaster total damage International disaster database of the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters (CRED) 
Conflict Conflict. Dummy variable that 
takes one if the country is in 
conflict and zero otherwise 
Uppsala Conflict Database of the 
International Peace Research Institute 
(PRIO) 
Trade Imports plus exports in 
percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Inflation Consumer inflation rate World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Agriculture Agriculture value added in 
percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Education Public spending on education in 
percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Polity2 Polity2 Index Polity4 Project (Integrated Network for 
Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) 
2013) 
Social 
protection 
Social protection expenditures 
in percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Pupil-
teacher ratio 
Number of pupils enrolled in 
primary school divided by the 
number of primary school 
teachers 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Bed Number of beds per 1,000 
people 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Mortality Infant Mortality rate World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
Road Paved roads in percentage of 
total roads 
World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank (2014) 
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Table A5: Samples 
Countries 
Albania Lesotho 
Argentina Madagascar 
Armenia Mexico 
Burundi Mali 
Burkina Faso Mongolia 
Bangladesh Mauritius 
Belarus Malaysia 
Bolivia Namibia 
Brazil Niger 
Bhutan Nicaragua 
China Nepal 
Cameroon Pakistan 
Colombia Panama 
Costa Rica Peru 
Dominican Republic Philippines 
Ecuador Paraguay 
Egypt Senegal 
Guatemala El Salvador 
Indonesia Thailand 
India Tajikistan 
Iran Tunisia 
Jordan Turkey 
Kazakhstan Tanzania 
Kenya Uganda 
Kyrgyz Republic Ukraine 
Cambodia Venezuela 
Sri Lanka Yemen, Republic of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
